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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ACT AND ITS CRITICS
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “Act”),
passed by the US Congress on 12 October and signed into
law by President Bush on 22 October 2004, has been
greeted by general dismay by various critics (including a
front-page story in The New York Times).1 The Act has
been described as overloaded with “pork” and giveaways
to special interest groups like tobacco farmers. The critics
contend that the only achievement of the Act, the repeal of
the “extraterritorial income” (ETI) regime that was ruled
by the WTO to be a prohibited export subsidy, is dwarfed
by 633 pages of special interest legislation.2 Even the Bush
Administration distanced itself from the Act, contending
that the ETI repeal could have been achieved with much
less pork attached.3
These critiques may be true, although they display a some-
what unrealistic sense of what kind of legislation is likely
to be enacted less than a month before an election. What
the critics of the Act fail to notice, however, is that in add-
ition to the ETI repeal, the Act has three highly important
positive features related to simplification, fairness and
closing loopholes in the US international tax regime.
First, the Act contains the most far-reaching simplification
of the US international tax regime in many decades.
Specifically, the Act finally (after many failed attempts
over the course of the last two decades) reduces the num-
ber of anti-deferral regimes from six to three. More con-
troversially, but in this author’s opinion correctly, the Act
also reduces the number of foreign tax credit “baskets”
from nine to two. These two steps by themselves will go a
long way to reduce the complexity and transaction costs of
the US international tax regime.
Second, the Act also resolves several problems that go
back to the 1986 Tax Reform Act and which, for revenue
reasons, involved blatant unfairness towards US resident
individuals and corporations. The Act eliminates the
exclusion of foreign debt and assets in calculating the allo-
cation of worldwide interest expense, which frequently
leads to double taxation. The Act also addresses the one-
sided application of the overall foreign loss rule to reduce
the foreign tax credit limitation. In addition, the Act elim-
inates the double taxation resulting from reducing the for-
eign tax credit for alternative minimum tax purposes.
Finally, the Act addresses several notorious loopholes in
the US international tax legislation. The Act erects a bar-
rier against “inversion” transactions in which a US cor-
poration becomes a subsidiary of a foreign corporation in
order to escape the reach of Subpart F. The Act also finally
gives some teeth to the expatriation rule for individuals,
which is also the culmination of a legislative battle lasting
for over a decade.
The Act does not address the most controversial issue in
US international taxation, namely, the appropriate scope
of the anti-deferral rules. The Act does take one step for-
ward towards territoriality by enacting a temporary lower
rate for repatriations of the deferred profits of US multi-
nationals. While this move is controversial, its ultimate
meaning will only be known over time, and it can be inter-
preted as consistent with a move both towards limiting
deferral and towards expanding it.
This article addresses the most prominent international
provisions of the Act, but does not discuss every inter-
national provision since many of them involve relatively
small issues. Instead, the article highlights the major
changes achieved by the Act. The article also does not dis-
cuss the multitude of domestic provisions contained in the
Act (e.g. the Subchapter S simplification and anti-tax shel-
ter provisions), leaving that for another day.
1. “H.R. 4520, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”, 2004 Tax Notes Today
(TNT) 196-10 (8 October 2004); Andrews, Edmund L., “How Tax Bill Gave
Business More and More”, The New York Times, 13 October 2004, Sec. A, 
Col. 3.
2. “Ways and Means Democrats Criticize ‘Special Interest Provisions’ in
Jobs Bill”, 2004 TNT 196-36 (8 October 2004).
3. “Snow Shares Administration’s Views on ETI Repeal Bill with Top
Taxwriters”, 2004 TNT 194-19 (6 October 2004).
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2. SIMPLIFICATION PROVISIONS
2.1. Anti-deferral regimes
Before the Act, the United States had six anti-deferral
regimes, enacted progressively in the period from 1913 to
1986:
– the accumulated earnings tax (1913), in US Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (IRC) Secs. 531 to
537;
– the personal holding company rules (1937), in IRC
Secs. 541 to 547;
– the foreign personal holding company rules (1937), in
IRC Secs. 551 to 558;
– the foreign investment company rules (1962), in IRC
Secs. 1246 to 1247;
– Subpart F (1962), in IRC Secs. 951 to 964; and
– the passive foreign investment company rules (1986),
in IRC Secs. 1291 to 1298.
The proliferation of these rules is a classic example of how
the US tax code becomes more and more complex. Each
rule was designed to address perceived problems with the
previous rules, but the enactment of a new rule was not
accompanied by abolishing the previous rules, so that they
all operated simultaneously. Coordination rules were
sometimes adopted (e.g. the rule adopted in 1997 that a
“controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) under Subpart F
cannot also be a “passive foreign investment corporation”
(PFIC)). However, in order to prove that the US share-
holders of a foreign corporation were entitled to defer tax
on the corporation’s profits until they were distributed, it
was necessary for tax lawyers to establish that none of the
anti-deferral rules applied; thus, each had to be carefully
studied in turn. The result was a mind-numbing degree of
complexity.
Moreover, there was a very considerable degree of overlap
among the rules. For example, the personal holding com-
pany (PHC) and foreign personal holding company
(FPHC) rules are very similar to each other, and both are
designed to tax foreign corporations that earn primarily
passive income and are controlled by five or fewer US
individuals (“incorporated pocketbooks”). The reason for
having two regimes was that the PHC regime taxes the
PHC directly, while the FPHC regime taxes the US share-
holders on a deemed dividend, and in 1937 it was believed
that the United States could not tax a foreign corporation
directly on foreign-source income. This belief has now
been abandoned, so that both the PHC and FPHC regimes
apply to foreign corporations (Congress was so sure about
the jurisdictional rule in 1937 that it forgot to exclude for-
eign corporations from the PHC rules). Moreover, both
regimes are redundant with the much more modern PFIC
rules that have a similar definition of passive income, but
do not require any degree of control by US shareholders.
Similarly, the foreign investment company (FIC) regime
has been rendered obsolete by the enactment of the PFIC
rules.
In 1992, Congress twice passed, but the first President
Bush vetoed for unrelated reasons, legislation that would
have reduced the number of anti-deferral regimes. Thus,
the United States has been stuck with the six regimes for
over a decade despite widespread, bipartisan agreement
that they should be reduced. The Joint Committee on Tax-
ation recommended the reduction to three regimes in its
2001 report on simplification, but nothing was done for
over three years.4 Finally, the passage of the Act afforded
the necessary vehicle for adopting this major simplifying
move.
The Act simply abolishes the FPHC and FIC regimes since
they are redundant with the PFIC regime.5 The PHC rules
have been clarified by excluding foreign corporations, as
was intended by Congress in 1937. The United States is
thus left with only three anti-deferral regimes: the accu-
mulated earnings tax rules, which rarely apply and can be
safely ignored in most cases, and the two major regimes,
PFIC (largely for small individual shareholders) and Sub-
part F (for multinational corporations).
The two remaining regimes are still too complex. For
example, the PFIC regime has three alternative ways to
calculate the tax liability on the deferred profits of a PFIC
– by applying an interest charge to an actual distribution or
disposition, by electing current taxation on a deemed divi-
dend, or by marking the shares of the PFIC to market.
None of these rules is ideal. The current taxation option
depends on the PFIC providing the US shareholders with
the requisite information, which it frequently will not do
for small shareholders; the mark-to-market option applies
only to publicly-traded PFICs and is unpopular because it
requires paying tax on what might be ephemeral stock
market gains; and the interest charge method is very com-
plicated. Thus, the American Bar Association (ABA) Tax-
ation Section has recommended restricting the PFIC rules
to wealthy shareholders (who can afford to deal with the
complexity) by adopting a de minimis exclusion; this
author supports such a move.6
Subpart F is also very complex as well as obsolete: the line
that it draws between the types of income that do and do
not benefit from deferral depends on an outdated assump-
tion that passive income can be earned overseas without
significant foreign tax, but active income cannot. This
author has argued elsewhere for adopting a different line,
between high-taxed and low-taxed foreign income, and
Senator John Kerry has advocated yet another line
(between income from sales in the CFC’s country of in-
corporation and income from sales elsewhere).7 The reso-
lution of this issue, which is highly politicized, must await
the new Bush Administration.
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4. Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of the Overall State of the Federal Tax
System and Recommendations for Simplification (April 2001), at 834. See Avi-
Yonah, Reuven S., “Making Sense of U.S. International Taxation: Six Steps
Toward Simplification”, 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation
9/10 (2001), at 493.
5. Act, Sec. 413; “Managers’ Statement on Corporate Tax Bill”, 2004 
TNT 196-11 (7 October 2004) (hereafter “Legis. Hist.”), Title III, Sec. 13.
6. “ABA Taxation Section Testimony at W&M Oversight Panel Hearing on
Code”, 1999 TNT 102-64 (25 May 1999).
7. See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F:
A Comparative Perspective”, 16 Tax Notes International 1797 (8 June 1998);
see also Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Ingenious Kerry Tax Plan”, 103 Tax 
Notes 477 (26 April 2004).
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2.2. Foreign tax credit baskets
Since 1986, the US foreign tax credit regime has been
determined by both an overall limitation (restricting the
credit to the US tax rate multiplied by foreign-source
income) and a “per category of income”, or “basket”, limi-
tation (applying the overall limit separately to each of sev-
eral baskets) (IRC Secs. 904(a) and (d)). Before the Act,
there were nine such baskets: (1) passive income, (2) high
withholding tax interest, (3) financial services income, (4)
shipping income, (5) dividends received from certain non-
controlled (“10/50”) foreign corporations, (6) dividends
from domestic international sales corporations (DISCs),
(7) foreign trade income, (8) distributions from foreign
sales corporations (FSCs), and (9) any other income
(“general limitation” income) (IRC Sec. 904(d)).
The rationale behind the baskets was that, if a US corpor-
ation was in an excess credit position because its foreign
taxes exceeded the general limitation, it had an incentive
to earn low-taxed foreign-source income so as to increase
its limitation. This incentive to invest abroad rather than in
the United States violated capital-export neutrality (CEN)
and encouraged tax competition by foreign tax havens. By
adopting the baskets, the 1986 Tax Reform Act sought to
prevent US multinationals from averaging high-taxed
active income with low-taxed passive income, as well as
high-taxed passive income with low-taxed passive
income.8
It is doubtful how well the baskets achieved their desired
purpose. In particular, the statistics of the US Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) indicate that, despite the baskets, US
multinationals were able to credit 98% of their foreign
taxes.9 One primary reason was the ability to average, in
the general basket, the high-taxed and low-taxed active
income. Critics have therefore proposed that the US
should superimpose a per-country limitation on top of the
baskets (an idea that was proposed and rejected as unduly
complex in 1986). In addition, the baskets sometimes had
perverse results, such as discouraging the formation of
50/50 joint ventures between US and foreign corporations
(because of the 10/50 basket, which was partially abol-
ished in 2002) or the 4.9% withholding rate on interest in
the United States–Mexico tax treaty (to avoid the high
withholding tax interest basket, which applies from 5%).
As this author has argued previously,10 the baskets are mis-
guided because their fundamental rationale (preserving
CEN) only applies to corporations in an excess credit pos-
ition. This can be illustrated by the following example, in
which the taxpayer invests first in a high-tax foreign coun-
try, Foreign Country A:
Example
Foreign Country A
taxable income 100
foreign tax 50
US tentative tax 35
foreign tax credit (FTC) limitation 35 (35% x 100)
foreign tax credit (35)
net US tax 0
total tax 50
after-tax income 50
excess credit 15
The taxpayer now can choose between investing to earn an
additional 100 in the United States or in Foreign Country
B, which has no income tax. If the taxpayer invests in the
United States, the result will be:
Foreign Country A United States
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 50 0
US tentative tax 35 35
FTC limitation 35 (35% x 100) 0
foreign tax credit (35) 0
net US tax 0 35
total tax 50 35
after-tax income 50 65
excess credit 15
If the taxpayer invests in Foreign Country B, the result will
be:
Foreign Country A Foreign Country B
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 50 0
US tentative tax 35 35
FTC limitation 70 (35% x 200) 70
foreign tax credit (50) 0
net US tax (15) 35
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess credit 0
Thus, in this case, the taxpayer has an incentive to invest
in Foreign Country B and not in the United States, which
violates CEN.
But consider a taxpayer in an excess limitation position
because the taxpayer invests first in Foreign Country B:
Foreign Country B
taxable income 100
foreign tax 0
US tentative tax 35
FTC limitation 35 (35% x 100)
foreign tax credit 0
net US tax 35
total tax 35
after-tax income 65
excess limitation 35
The taxpayer can now choose between investing to earn an
additional 100 in the United States or in Foreign Country
A, which has an income tax levied at 50%. If the taxpayer
invests in the United States, the result will be:
Foreign Country B United States
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 0 0
US tentative tax 35 35
FTC limitation 35 (35% x 100) 0
foreign tax credit 0 0
net US tax 35 35
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess limitation 35
8. For a classic defence of the baskets, see Kingson, Charles I., “The Foreign
Tax Credit and Its Critics”, 9 American Journal of Tax Policy 1 (1991).
9. “SOI Winter 1994-5 Bulletin”, 95 TNT 66-43 (5 April 1995).
10. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 4.
If the taxpayer invests in Foreign Country A, the result
will be:
Foreign Country B Foreign Country A
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 0 50
US tentative tax 35 35
FTC limitation 70 (35% x 200) 70
foreign tax credit 0 (50)
net US tax 35 (15)
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess limitation 20
Thus, CEN is not violated in this case: the taxpayer is
indifferent between investing in the United States or in
Foreign Country A. The only difference is the revenues of
the US Treasury, which are 70 if the investment is made in
the US, but only 20 if the investment is made in Foreign
Country A.
The general conclusion is that the basket system is needed
to protect CEN only for taxpayers in an excess credit pos-
ition, but not for taxpayers at the limit or in an excess limi-
tation position. Since most US multinationals are currently
in a neutral or excess limitation position, it is questionable
whether the baskets are needed to protect CEN.
More generally, one has to remember that the imposition
of the foreign tax credit limitation in the first place violates
CEN. It is a necessary concession to reality, however,
because an unlimited credit offers too much incentive to
other countries to raise their tax rates at the expense of the
US Treasury. But having made that concession, it does not
appear sensible to this author to add a highly complicated
basket system just because, for some taxpayers, there will
be an incentive to invest elsewhere depending on the pre-
cise order of their investments. In the end, the worst thing
that can happen from allowing cross-crediting will be that
taxpayers can always credit all of their foreign taxes,
which they also seem to be able to do today with much
transactional complexity and planning. Full crediting of
the foreign taxes imposed primarily on active income is
consistent with CEN. Therefore, this author would have
supported abolishing the baskets and permitting taxpayers
to cross-credit freely.11
The Act does not go quite that far. Presumably, the rev-
enue effect of freely permitting multinationals to credit all
foreign taxes by averaging them with low-taxed foreign-
source passive income was too negative. But the Act does
advance significantly in the same direction by abolishing
(from 2007) all the baskets except the general limitation
and passive baskets.12 Financial services income, shipping
income and distributions from former DISCs and FSCs
will fall into the general basket, while high withholding
tax interest will fall into the passive basket. Dividends
from 10/50 corporations are granted look-through treat-
ment and thus will fall into the same basket as the under-
lying income (Act, Sec. 403).
Critics have assailed this provision as a violation of CEN
and as an incentive for US multinationals to invest in low-
tax foreign countries.13 While this is true in some situ-
ations, the number of US multinationals in an excess credit
position was limited even before the ability to average
across baskets. This is in part because the foreign corpor-
ate tax rates have declined and in part because of transac-
tions designed to reduce the effective foreign tax rate.14
The change in the interest allocation rules described below
will further reduce the number of taxpayers in an excess
credit position. Thus, this author believes that this reform,
which represents a major simplification of the US foreign
tax credit rules, is worth it.
3. FAIRNESS PROVISIONS
3.1. Interest expense allocation
Before 1986, interest expense was allocated by comparing
the US to the foreign assets ratio of each US and foreign
corporation separately. Thus, assume that P is the US par-
ent of a group of corporations that includes D, a domestic
corporation, and D’s subsidiary F, a foreign corporation,
and that D and F each have USD 1,000 in assets. If D were
to borrow funds and pay USD 100 in interest expense, that
expense would be allocated USD 50 to US-source income
and USD 50 to foreign-source income because D has USD
1,000 in US assets (directly) and USD 1,000 in foreign
assets (the stock of F). If P were to borrow funds, however,
the entire USD 100 in interest expense would be allocated
to US-source income because all of P’s assets (the D
stock) are domestic. Thus, borrowing by P would max-
imize the group’s ability to use any foreign tax credits for
the taxes imposed on F because no interest expense would
be allocated to reduce D’s foreign-source income (a divi-
dend from F).
The allocation of the USD 100 of P’s interest expense to
US-source income at P’s level resulted from an inconsist-
ent concept. For purposes of filing consolidated tax returns
– that is, combining the income and deductions of P and D
– the separate existence of the D stock was disregarded.
But for purposes of apportioning P’s interest deduction,
the D stock was treated (before the enactment of IRC Sec.
864(e)(1) in 1986) as a distinct opaque asset – an asset that
produced US-source income. The D stock would generate
US-source dividends to P since less than 80% of D’s gross
income was from foreign sources (see IRC Sec.
861(c)(1)). This fact was taken into account even though
D’s dividends to P were not taxed, pursuant to the con-
solidated return theory that P and D should be treated as a
single entity.
IRC Sec. 864(e)(1) disregards the stock of D for both
apportionment and consolidated return purposes. Thus,
since the combined P and D assets consist of USD 1,000
30 BULLETIN JANUARY 2005
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11. With one caveat: The foreign tax must indeed be imposed on the taxpayer,
and transactions that generate artificially high foreign tax credits on minimal or
no profits must be struck down. Unfortunately, the US Treasury recently with-
drew Notice 98-5, 1998-3 IRB 49, and the standards imposed by its replacement
(Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 IRB 606) are too vague. More enforcement is needed
in this area to prevent results like the one reached in Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), reversed, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
12. Act, Sec. 403; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, Title III, Sec. 3.
13. See Fleming, J. Clifton and Robert Peroni, “Eviscerating the Foreign Tax
Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax – What’s ETI Repeal Got
To Do With It?”, 104 Tax Notes 1393 (20 September 2004).
14. See e.g. the transactions described Notice 98-11, 1998-6 IRB 18.
domestic and USD 1,000 foreign assets, the USD 100 of
interest expense is allocated equally between foreign and
domestic income – USD 50 to each – just as if D had
incurred the expense directly.
As enacted in 1986, however, Sec. 864(e)(1) did not apply
its consolidated approach to include the debt incurred by
foreign corporations. Thus, assume that D is a domestic
corporation and F is its foreign subsidiary, that they each
have USD 1,000 in assets, and that they incur USD 50 of
interest expense on USD 500 of debt to unrelated parties.
In this case, D’s interest expense is allocated USD 33 to
US-source income and USD 17 to foreign-source income,
while all of F’s USD 50 is allocated to foreign-source
income because D has USD 1,000 in US assets and USD
500 in foreign assets (the value of the F stock, reduced by
its debt), while all of F’s assets are foreign.
The allocation of D’s interest expense is based on compar-
ing the USD 1,000 in domestic assets to the value of the F
stock held by D (as D’s foreign asset), which is only USD
500 because of F’s debt. F’s assets and interest expense are
not taken into account in this calculation. This reaches a
result that is both illogical and unfair, especially given the
pro-government result reached by IRC Sec. 864(e)(1)
(requiring the aggregation of all domestic subsidiaries). If
D had incurred the entire USD 100 of interest expense, it
would have had USD 50 of US-source income and USD
50 of foreign-source income (because its assets are 50%
domestic and 50% foreign).15 If D’s assets are to be deter-
mined on a look-through basis by disregarding the stock of
domestic subsidiaries, it switches premises to disregard
F’s liabilities for purposes of apportioning the interest
expense.16 On revenue grounds, however, Congress
rejected this result in 1986 and confined direct apportion-
ment to the assets held by the US consolidated group.17
The Act changes this result from 2008 onward by provid-
ing a one-time election under which the taxable income of
the domestic members of an affiliated group from sources
outside the United States is generally determined by allo-
cating and apportioning the interest expense of the domes-
tic members of a “worldwide affiliated group”18 on a
worldwide-group basis (i.e. as if all members of the world-
wide group were a single corporation) (the “worldwide
fungibility election”). If a group makes this election, the
taxable income of the domestic members of a worldwide
affiliated group from sources outside the United States is
determined by allocating and apportioning the third-party
interest expense of those domestic members to foreign-
source income in an amount equal to the excess (if any) of
(i) the worldwide affiliated group’s worldwide third-party
interest expense multiplied by the ratio which the foreign
assets of the worldwide affiliated group bear to the group’s
total assets, over (ii) the third-party interest expense
incurred by the foreign members of the group to the extent
such interest would be allocated to foreign sources if the
provision’s principles were applied separately to the for-
eign members of the group.
Thus, if the D/F group in the example above made the
election and D borrowed the entire USD 1,000, D’s USD
100 of interest expense would be allocated based on
directly comparing the D/F affiliated group’s USD 1,000
in US assets to its USD 1,000 in foreign assets, so that
USD 50 would be allocated to US-source income and
USD 50 to foreign-source income. If F borrowed the entire
USD 1,000, all of its interest expense would be allocated
to foreign-source income based on its assets (since the pro-
vision applies only to the interest expense of domestic
corporations). If D borrowed USD 500 and F borrowed
USD 500, all of F’s interest expense would be allocated to
foreign-source income and all of D’s interest expense
would be allocated to US-source income (because there is
no excess of the worldwide interest expense (USD 100)
multiplied by the foreign to US asset ratio (50%), or USD
50, over the interest expense incurred by F (USD 50)).
This is the correct result, and it is also more congruent
with following the books and allocating D’s interest
expense to US-source income and F’s interest expense to
foreign-source income. Since most other countries follow
the books for this purpose, the new rule is likely to pro-
duce less excess foreign tax credits (which can result if the
foreign jurisdiction regards F as having more income than
the US does because of the allocation of US-booked inter-
est expense to F). Meanwhile, however, the new rule does
not abandon the basic concept of fungibility of interest
expense within a consolidated group, which is needed to
prevent manipulation by taxpayers (as illustrated by the
pre-1986 rule, explained above).19
Another interesting aspect of the new rule is that, since it
allocates interest expense on the basis of the worldwide
assets of a consolidated group, it brings the United States
one step closer to using global formulary apportionment
for consolidated groups. If expenses can be allocated using
formulas (in this case, based on assets), so can income.
Hopefully, this will lead to a reconsideration of the use of
formulas in the transfer pricing context as well, which is
essential to achieving meaningful simplification in that
area.20
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15. The F stock would be worth USD 1,000 because F would have no debt.
16. Although F’s USD 500 liability increases the asset apportionment ratio
from 1,000/2,000 (if D had incurred the entire USD 1,000 liability) 
to 1,000/1,500, the result is akin to giving a corporation a deduction, rather than
a credit, for foreign taxes. Borrowings incurred by a foreign subsidiary should be
the equivalent of borrowings incurred by its domestic parent, not just a propor-
tion thereof.
17. The correct result could be reached if D borrowed the entire USD 1,000
and on-lent USD 500 to F because then the reduction in value of the F stock
would be offset by holding the note from F, so that D would have USD 1,000 in
US assets and USD 1,000 in foreign assets. The IRS, however, has adopted a
complicated “CFC netting rule” to prevent this attempt by taxpayers to correct
the unfairness described above. See Treas. Reg. 1.861-10(e).
18. The term “worldwide affiliated group” means a group consisting of (i) the
includible members of an affiliated group and (ii) all the CFCs in which such
members in the aggregate meet the ownership requirements of IRC 
Sec. 1504(a)(2) either directly or indirectly through applying IRC Sec. 958(a)(2)
or through applying rules similar to those of Sec. 958(a)(2) to the stock owned
directly or indirectly by domestic partnerships, trusts or estates. IRC 
Sec. 864(f)(1)(C).
19. For a different view, see Shaviro, Daniel, “Does More Sophisticated Mean
Better? A Critique of Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense
of US Multinationals”, 54 Tax Law Review 353 (2001). 
20. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 4.
3.2. Overall domestic loss
If a taxpayer’s losses from foreign sources exceed its for-
eign-source income, the excess or overall foreign loss may
offset its US-source income. Present law, however, elim-
inates this double benefit (reduction of US tax and, in a
later year, full allowance of a foreign tax credit with
respect to foreign-source income) by imposing an overall
foreign loss recapture rule (IRC Sec. 904(g)). Under this
rule, a portion of foreign-source taxable income earned
after an overall foreign loss year is recharacterized as US-
source taxable income for foreign tax credit purposes.
Under current law, however, if a taxpayer incurs losses
from US sources in excess of foreign-source income, no
foreign tax credit can be claimed for the taxes paid abroad.
If the taxpayer then earns US-source income and foreign-
source income in the following taxable year, present law
does not recharacterize any portion of the US-source
income as foreign-source income to reflect the fact that the
previous year’s US-source loss reduced the taxpayer’s
ability to claim foreign tax credits. This one-sided applica-
tion of the rule is manifestly unfair and was again adopted
in 1986 for revenue reasons.
The Act applies a re-sourcing rule to US-source income in
cases in which a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation
was reduced as a result of an “overall domestic loss”. In
order to provide parity in the treatment of overall foreign
losses and overall domestic losses and to prevent the
double taxation of income, under the Act a portion of the
taxpayer’s US-source income may be characterized as for-
eign-source income (in any succeeding taxable year) in an
amount equal to the lesser of (i) the amount of “unrechar-
acterized” overall domestic loss (for years prior to the suc-
ceeding year) and (ii) 50% of the taxpayer’s US-source
income for such succeeding taxable year. Any US-source
income recharacterized under the Act is allocated among
and increases the various foreign tax credit baskets in the
same proportion that those baskets were reduced by the
prior overall domestic loss. This provision applies to
losses incurred in taxable years beginning after 31 Decem-
ber 2006.21
3.3. Foreign tax credits and the AMT
Under present law, taxpayers are subject to an alternative
minimum tax (AMT) which is payable, in addition to all
other tax liabilities, to the extent it exceeds the taxpayer’s
regular income tax liability. In the case of corporate tax-
payers, the tax is imposed at a flat rate of 20% on the alter-
native minimum taxable income (AMTI) in excess of an
exemption amount that phases out. The AMTI is the tax-
payer’s taxable income increased by certain tax prefer-
ences and adjusted by determining the tax treatment of
certain items in a manner that limits the tax benefits result-
ing from the regular tax treatment of those items.
Taxpayers are generally permitted to reduce their AMT
liability by an AMT foreign tax credit. The AMT foreign
tax credit for a taxable year is determined under principles
similar to those used in computing the regular foreign tax
credit, except that (1) the numerator of the AMT foreign
tax credit limitation fraction is foreign-source AMTI and
(2) the denominator of that fraction is total AMTI. Tax-
payers may elect to use as their AMT foreign tax credit
limitation fraction the ratio of foreign-source regular tax-
able income to total AMTI.
Under current law, however, the AMT foreign tax credit
for any taxable year may generally not offset a taxpayer’s
entire pre-credit AMT. Rather, the AMT foreign tax credit
is limited to 90% of the AMT computed without any AMT
net operating loss deduction and the AMT foreign tax
credit. For example, assume that a corporation’s AMTI is
USD 10 million and that the corporation has no AMT net
operating loss deduction and no regular tax liability. In the
absence of the AMT foreign tax credit, the corporation’s
tax liability would be USD 2 million. Accordingly, the
AMT foreign tax credit cannot be applied to reduce the
taxpayer’s tax liability below USD 200,000.
This limitation is manifestly unfair since it directly pro-
duces double taxation: the USD 200,000 tax liability to the
United States is duplicated by a USD 200,000 tax liability
to a foreign jurisdiction. There is no justification for this
other than raising revenue and a wish to see corporations
pay some US tax. The Act correctly repeals the limitation
so that a corporation subject to the AMT can fully offset it
with foreign tax credits for taxes actually paid on foreign-
source income.22
4. LIMITS ON EXPATRIATION
4.1. Corporations
From 1997 onward, over 20 publicly-traded US corpor-
ations engaged in “inversion” transactions in which their
shareholders exchanged the shares of the US corporation
for shares of a newly formed Bermuda entity. Thus, the
Bermuda corporation became the parent, and the US cor-
poration its wholly-owned subsidiary. The purpose of
these transactions was twofold: (a) to enable new foreign
subsidiaries of the Bermuda corporation to be formed
without being subject to Subpart F (since only 10% or
more US shareholders count for Subpart F purposes, so
that the ultimate ownership by the US public did not mat-
ter), and (b) to reduce the US-source income of the US
corporation by making deductible interest and royalty pay-
ments to the Bermuda parent without triggering the Sub-
part F inclusions for passive income (since the Bermuda
parent is not a CFC).23
In 1994, the IRS announced that these types of transac-
tions would be subject to tax at the shareholder level, but
this did not stop the trend since the tax savings were at the
corporate level. After 11 September 2001, these transac-
tions began to attract negative publicity, and at least one
corporation abandoned its planned inversion midstream
under pressure. Legislation to prevent inversions has been
introduced numerous times, but the Act finally incorp-
orates anti-inversion provisions, effective for inversions
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21. Act, Sec. 302; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, Title III, Sec. 2.
22. Act, Sec. 241; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, D, Sec. 1.
23. See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion
Transactions”, 95 Tax Notes 1793 (17 June 2002).
after 4 March 2003 (when the anti-inversion legislation
was first introduced).24
The Act defines two different types of corporate inversion
transactions and establishes a different set of conse-
quences for each type. The first type of inversion is a
transaction in which, pursuant to a plan or a series of
related transactions: (1) a US corporation becomes a sub-
sidiary of a foreign-incorporated entity or otherwise trans-
fers substantially all of its properties to such an entity in a
transaction completed after 4 March 2003; (2) the former
shareholders of the US corporation hold (by reason of
holding stock in the US corporation) 80% or more (by vote
or value) of the stock of the foreign-incorporated entity
after the transaction; and (3) the foreign-incorporated
entity, considered together with all companies connected
to it by a chain of greater than 50% ownership (i.e. the
“expanded affiliated group”), does not have substantial
business activities in the entity’s country of incorporation,
compared to the total worldwide business activities of the
expanded affiliated group. The Act denies the intended tax
benefits of this type of inversion by deeming the top-tier
foreign corporation to be a domestic corporation for all
purposes of the IRC.25
The second type of inversion is a transaction that would
meet the definition of an inversion transaction described
above, except that the 80% ownership threshold is not met.
In such a case, if at least a 60% ownership threshold is
met, a second set of rules applies to the inversion. Under
these rules, the inversion transaction is respected (i.e. the
foreign corporation is treated as foreign), but any applic-
able corporate-level “toll charges” for establishing the
inverted structure are not offset by any tax attributes, such
as net operating losses or foreign tax credits. Specifically,
any applicable corporate-level income or gain required to
be recognized under IRC Secs. 304, 311(b), 367, 1001,
1248 or any other provision with respect to the transfer of
CFC stock or the transfer or license of other assets by a US
corporation as part of the inversion transaction, or after
such transaction to a related foreign person, is taxable,
without being offset by any tax attributes (e.g. net operat-
ing losses or foreign tax credits). This rule does not apply
to certain transfers of inventory and similar property.
These measures generally apply for a ten-year period fol-
lowing the inversion transaction.
There have been no reported inversion transactions since
the anti-inversion legislation was first introduced in 2003,
presumably because taxpayers wanted to see the precise
shape of the legislation. Now that the anti-inversion legis-
lation has been enacted, taxpayers may try to find loop-
holes in it, which would require further action.26
Nevertheless, it is never a good reason not to stop a glaring
loophole just because the solution may itself have prob-
lems. Inversions were a serious challenge to the ability of
Congress to impose taxes on US corporations. If nothing
had been done, Subpart F would be in serious jeopardy.
Thus, the anti-inversion provisions are a significant step
forward.
4.2. Individuals
The United States is unique in taxing its citizens on their
worldwide income even when they reside elsewhere.
Thus, moving out of the United States is insufficient to
stop worldwide taxation; it is also necessary to abandon
US citizenship.
For a long time, IRC Sec. 877 attempted to limit the abil-
ity to reduce taxes by expatriation by subjecting certain
former citizens to tax for a ten-year period as if they were
still citizens. US tax treaties preserve the United States’
ability to do so. IRC Sec. 877, however, was a notorious
paper tiger because it required the IRS to show that the
expatriation was tax-motivated and, in most cases, the IRS
failed to do so.
In 1996, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
attempted to strengthen IRC Sec. 877 by imposing tax on
a deemed sale of assets upon expatriation. Republicans in
Congress, however, managed to block the Moynihan pro-
posal and substitute a weak set of rebuttable presumptions,
which again were easy to avoid in practice.
The Act finally does something real about tax-motivated
expatriations by replacing the subjective determination of
tax avoidance as a principal purpose for relinquishing citi-
zenship or terminating residence under present law with
objective rules.27 Under the Act, a former citizen or former
long-term resident is subject to an alternative tax regime
(i.e. in general, taxed as if he/she were still a citizen) for a
ten-year period following citizenship relinquishment or
residence termination, unless the former citizen or former
long-term resident: (1) establishes that his/her average
annual net income tax liability for the five preceding years
does not exceed USD 124,000 (adjusted for inflation after
2004) and his/her net worth does not exceed USD 2 mil-
lion or, alternatively, satisfies limited, objective excep-
tions for dual citizens and minors who have had no sub-
stantial contact with the United States; and (2) certifies
under the penalties of perjury that he/she has complied
with all US federal tax obligations for the five preceding
years and provides such evidence of compliance as the
Secretary of the US Treasury may require.
The alternative tax regime does not apply to an individual
for any taxable year during the ten-year period following
citizenship relinquishment or residence termination if the
individual is present in the United States for more than 30
days in the calendar year ending in such taxable year. The
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24. Act, Sec. 601; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, Title X, A, Sec. 1.
25. In determining whether a transaction meets the definition of “inversion”
under the Act, the stock held by members of the expanded affiliated group that
includes the foreign-incorporated entity is disregarded. For example, if the for-
mer top-tier US corporation receives stock of the foreign-incorporated entity
(e.g. “hook” stock), the stock would not be considered in determining whether
the transaction meets the definition. Similarly, if a US parent corporation con-
verts an existing wholly-owned US subsidiary into a new wholly-owned CFC,
the stock of the new foreign corporation would be disregarded. Stock sold in a
public offering related to the transaction is also disregarded for these purposes.
26. This author has proposed a simpler solution that would incorporate a “man-
aged and controlled” test into the definition of “US corporation” since inverted
entities invariably continue to be managed from the United States. Such a test
may still be desirable if it turns out that there are technical loopholes in the
enacted provisions.
27. Act, Sec. 604; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, Title X, A, Sec. 4.
individual is treated as a US citizen or resident for that tax-
able year and is therefore taxed on his/her worldwide
income.
Before the Act, US citizens could move abroad, relinquish
their citizenship and avoid US taxation on foreign-source
income (e.g. capital gains on the sale of appreciated
stock). As long as they were able to establish some con-
nection to the country to which they moved, such expatri-
ations were successful. It remains to be seen whether such
expatriations will continue under the Act, but the replace-
ment of subjective standards with a rule targeted at rich
expatriates was long overdue.
5. A MOVE TOWARD TERRITORIALITY?
Perhaps the most controversial portion of the Act is a tem-
porary (one year) reduction of the tax rate on actual divi-
dends from CFCs from 35% to 5.25%.28 The intent is to
encourage US multinationals to repatriate earnings that
were “trapped” overseas by deferral and by the dividend
tax, thus hopefully creating more US jobs.
This provision has been broadly criticized as providing a
windfall to those US multinationals that benefited from
deferral by keeping their profits overseas, while penaliz-
ing those multinationals that repatriated their income and
paid the full dividend tax.29 Moreover, the provision’s
actual impact on job creation is uncertain because US
multinationals are free to use the funds in any way they
wish (except to pay executive compensation) and money
is fungible.
This author has no view on the job-creating aspect of this
provision, but believes that the critique is overstated. The
repatriation rate of US multinationals before this provision
was very low (about 16%), and almost all of those divi-
dends carried full foreign tax credits; thus, the actual rev-
enue collected was minimal. Meanwhile, there is little
question that the tax on dividends impeded the repatriation
of low-taxed foreign earnings. A tax that changes
behaviour while collecting almost no revenue is a bad tax.
A broader perspective on this question is needed. Funda-
mentally, a multinational should be regarded as a single
taxpayer: the artificial distinction between branches and
subsidiaries has little real life meaning for most multi-
nationals and, in the post check-the-box environment,
these distinctions have become even more meaningless.
If this perspective is adopted, dividends and other forms of
transfer within a multinational should be disregarded, just
as they are in a domestic consolidated group. Thus, from
this perspective, it makes sense not just to reduce the tax
on dividends from CFCs to their US parent, but to elim-
inate the tax completely. It is only the fictional separate
entity treatment of the parent and the subsidiaries which
justifies taxing these dividends. Given the real life impedi-
ments to the free transfer of funds within a multinational
that the tax on dividends creates and the minimal revenue
it generates, the tax on dividends should be abolished.
It is important to note that this result holds whether or not
the United States taxes the foreign-source earnings of
CFCs, i.e. whether or not deferral applies. Clearly, where
deferral does not apply, dividends should not be taxed. The
fact that deferral does apply to some income does not
change the result: dividends should still not be taxed.
Opponents of deferral would say, however, that this situ-
ation is different from a consolidated return because, in
that case, the subsidiaries are subject to US tax, whereas in
the foreign situation, they are not subject to US tax and
may not be subject to tax at all. But this is an argument in
favour of abolishing deferral, not taxing dividends.
There are two ways of approaching the taxation of multi-
nationals. The first is to say that, given the primacy of
source-based taxation of active income in the international
tax regime, multinationals should be taxed only at source.
This would lead to pure territoriality, with foreign-source
income not being taxed either when earned or when dis-
tributed.
There are, however, two major problems with a purely ter-
ritorial approach. First, in the current tax world, the source
of income is an elusive concept, and transfer pricing fol-
lows the artificial separate accounting rule and allows for
shifting income between jurisdictions. In this context,
adopting territoriality would lead to the need for much
more enforcement of transfer pricing and source rules,
which would greatly reduce the simplification benefits of
such a move. If the United States had formulary appor-
tionment with a requirement of real presence in a country
(e.g. payroll and assets) in order to book profits there, ter-
ritoriality would be much more attractive.
Second, in a world with rampant tax competition, active
income can be earned abroad without being subject to sig-
nificant tax because of the prevalence of targeted tax
regimes (“production tax havens”). Territoriality encour-
ages such competition and means that multinationals pay
much less than one level of tax on active income.
Because of these two considerations, this author has been
opposed to territoriality. Instead, the optimal result would
be to abolish deferral in cooperation with the other OECD
Member countries, as envisaged by the OECD’s project on
harmful tax competition. This would take care of the com-
petitiveness issue since 85% of multinationals are head-
quartered in the OECD Member countries.
If such cooperation cannot be achieved, the United States
should still act unilaterally to restrict deferral either by
extending Subpart F to all low-taxed foreign-source
income of CFCs or (as Senator Kerry suggested) by limit-
ing deferral to sales within the CFC’s country of incorp-
oration. In practice, these proposals are likely to amount to
the same thing because countries do not need to give tax
breaks to multinationals that sell into the country’s domes-
tic market (which is not movable).
Whatever approach is adopted for deferral, however,
should not govern the treatment of dividends from CFCs.
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28. Act, Sec. 271; Legis. Hist., supra note 5, Title II, G, new IRC Sec. 965.
Technically, the lower rate is accomplished by granting an 85% dividends-
received deduction. No foreign tax credits are available for the taxes imposed on
the deductible portion of the dividend.
29. Fleming and Peroni, supra note 13.
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They should not be taxed in either a deferral or a non-
deferral world, either because they were taxed already (if
there is no deferral) or because taxing them just impedes
moving capital within a multinational and generates no
revenue (if deferral persists). Thus, the temporary reduc-
tion of the tax rate on actual dividends from CFCs (in new
IRC Sec. 965) should be made permanent.30 This would
focus the debate where it belongs, namely, on the proper
scope of deferral.
6. CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Act contains much that is positive
beyond satisfying the United States’ WTO obligations by
repealing the ETI regime. The Act achieves significant
simplification (reduction in the number of anti-deferral
regimes and baskets), increases fairness (the interest allo-
cation rule, the overall domestic loss rule, and the foreign
tax credit for the AMT rule), and closes long-standing
loopholes (the expatriation provisions). Even the much
maligned repatriation provision can be defended as con-
sistent with both approaches to deferral.
More needs to be done to achieve further simplification
consistent with the basic goals of the US international tax
regime. Most importantly, the United States should con-
sider moving further in the direction of formulary appor-
tionment, as the European Union is considering for inter-
EU payments. This would greatly relieve the pressure on
transfer pricing and sourcing. The United States should
also simplify the source rules and Subpart F and abandon
the US withholding tax on outgoing payments. The Act
takes two steps out of the six recommended in this
author’s previous article,31 and it also contains many other
improvements. Contrary to the prevailing view, at least in
its international provisions, the Act is a significant step
forward.
30. And the rate can be reduced to zero. Presumably, the 5.25% rate was
needed for revenue reasons (and this tax may in fact generate some revenue). 
31. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 4.
